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Abstract
is article discusses the extraordinary history of the teaching of philosophy at 
Stellenbosch University, with a particular focus on the events that led to the split 
of the department in 1967, and its later reunication in the late 1980’s. e tensions 
that characterised these events, ultimately leading to the split of the department, 
were informed by resistance on the part of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) 
clergy, embodied by the supervisory body (‘kuratorium’) presiding over what would 
later become the faculty of theology of the Stellenbosch University, to the seemingly 
unorthodox and controversial interpretations of religious doctrine by a lecturer within 
the department of philosophy, Dr JJ Degenaar. e eventual solution to these dierences 
was the initial creation of two ‘streams’ in the department of philosophy, one of which 
would be political philosophy taught by Degenaar, and ultimately the creation of a 
separate department of political philosophy, headed by Degenaar. e article also deals 
with the process of re-unication of the two departments in the late 1980’s. Several 
insights can be gleaned from an analysis of these events. Firstly, they reveal the extent 
to which the DRC curatory was able to inuence academic aairs at that time, as well 
as to the extent to which Stellenbosch University allowed its institutional autonomy 
to be compromised. Secondly, they show how a certain model of religious experience 
and faith that was quite prominent in DRC circles in the late nineteenth century, 
was systematically overtaken by another model in the course of the early twentieth 
century. Finally, they show that within the two departments, a healthy culture of not 
only respect and collegiality, but also continued philosophical and political debate, 
was maintained throughout the 20 years of formal (30 years of eective) separation, 
thus illustrating the value of dialogue over intellectual immobility.
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1. e origins of philosophy teaching at Stellenbosch
Philosophy at Stellenbosch University dates back to the origin of the town’s 
higher educational tradition with the creation, on 1 November 1859, of 
the ‘Teologiese Kweekskool’, a seminary for the training of ministers for 
the Dutch Reformed Church. is training institution for DRC clergy 
was established as a bulwark for the defence and sustenance of orthodox 
Christian theology in response to the inuence, eects and ramications 
of the so-called ‘liberal movement’ of the mid-nineteenth century in South 
Africa – a movement associated with individuals like DP Faure, JJ Kotze, 
SP Heyns, HV Leibrandt and TF Burgers (Rossouw 2000; Brümmer 2013), 
minister of the Hanover Congregation, who eventually became president 
of the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republic. Philosophy was taught by the rst 
professors of the Kweekskool, John Murray and NJ Hofmeyr, from the 
outset. In 1877, Johannes Isak Marais was also appointed as professor in 
the Kweekskool in order to teach the ‘philosophical subjects’ i.e. ‘natural 
theology and speculative and practical philosophy’ (Brümmer 2013: xi). 
In 1866, a secondary school known as the Stellenbosch Gymnasium, now 
known as Paul Roos Gymnasium, was created with the express purpose 
of assistance in the preparation of potential students of the Kweekskool. 
is was reinforced by the addition of a post-matric year, and eventually 
two further years of preparatory undergraduate studies, in what was rst 
named the ‘Stellenbosch College’ and eventually the ‘Victoria College’ – 
an institution that was, for many years, not clearly distinguished from the 
school. In this context, Prof. omas Walker was, in 1878, appointed to 
teach both English and philosophy. From 1904, he focused exclusively on 
philosophy. Walker was joined in 1911 by Prof. NJ Brümmer, who was the 
rst full-time professor of philosophy. 
It can therefore be claimed that 1911 formally represents the year of birth 
of the department of philosophy, as a department distinct from English 
at Stellenbosch. Brümmer, an ex-clergyman of the DRC, took his main 
responsibility to be the philosophical orientation of students preparing 
for study at the Kweekskool in order to become DRC clergy. Brümmer, 
although a highly admired and inuential gure in his time, did not write 
much and was philosophically mainly inuenced by the late nineteenth 
century tradition of neo-idealism as represented in the work of gures such 
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as JE Turner and J Leighton (Kirsten 1972). It is a tradition that saw an 
almost complete demise in the twentieth century. In the controversial Du 
Plessis heresy trial of the early 1930’s (See Nash 2009: 65–84, as well as 
Rossouw 2000), Brümmer was known to be an outspoken supporter of Du 
Plessis (Brümmer 2013: xi). 
2. Degenaar comes to Stellenbosch
Not only does education in philosophy therefore have a long tradition at 
Stellenbosch (see Nash 1997); it can also claim to have one of the most 
poignant and complex histories of any part of this institution. e main 
reason for this is the highly unusual story of the controversy surrounding 
Dr JJ Degenaar, senior lecturer in philosophy from 1949, which led to 
the splitting of the department into two in 1967. is year (1967) saw the 
formalisation of this process, which was indeed preceded by a memorable 
train of events dating back to 1958. In this drama, the four central actors 
were the then rector, Prof. HB om, the head of the department of 
philosophy, Prof. JF Kirsten, the senior lecturer ociating at the time, Dr. JJ 
Degenaar, and the Dutch Reformed Church, embodied by the ‘kuratorium’ 
or supervisory curatory presiding over the Kweekskool, which during the 
1950’s was still the eological Seminary at Stellenbosch, and only in 1962, 
became the full-edged faculty of theology of the Stellenbosch University. 
e record shows curatory members JS Gericke and JD (Koot) Vorster to 
be particularly prominent in developments. is article will henceforth be 
focused on no more than the outline of this extraordinary history. I shall 
briey outline events and make a few interpretive comments at the end.
JF Kirsten was a student at Stellenbosch in the early 1930’s at the height of 
the Du Plessis controversy. He concurred with his philosophy professor, 
Brümmer’s, support of Du Plessis. is generated the wrath of (at least) 
one of his senior co-students, JD (Koot) Vorster, who, with others, objected 
to Kirsten’s legitimation as minister of the DRC on completion of his 
theological training in 1934. He was nevertheless admitted to the ministry 
by a majority vote of the curatory, and accepted a call to Kirkwood, where he 
ministered the congregation until 1942 when Brümmer (as was the custom 
in those days) solicited him and submitted his name as his (Brümmer’s) 
successor (personal information from Prof. Kirsten and Rossouw).
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e post-Second World War period brought about signicant changes 
in the intellectual climate at South African universities, particularly 
Stellenbosch. is contributed to a new surge of interest, no longer in the 
philosophical positioning of orthodox Christian belief, but in problems 
and approaches that dominated the intellectual life of a new generation 
of thinkers in the European context. Particularly prominent were 
phenomenology, existentialism and analytical philosophy. In the period 
between 1942 and 1950, Daantjie Oosthuizen, James Oglethorpe and Johan 
Degenaar proved themselves as the brightest lights of this new generation 
of philosophy students. Of the three, Degenaar was the only one who did 
not complete his theological studies and who kept a comparatively low 
prole in student politics. Yet it was he who was chosen by Kirsten to 
take up the new position of senior lecturer created in 1948, a position that 
had been temporarily lled by GS (Tappies) Möller for a few years before 
this. According to André du Toit, Degenaar was regarded as the ‘safest’ 
of the three in terms of continuing the traditional line of philosophy at 
Stellenbosch (Du Toit 2015). at idea turned out to be gravely mistaken.
3. A new voice in the 1950’s
e content of Degenaar’s courses in the 1950’s and the way in which his 
thinking contributed to a transformation of the tradition of philosophical 
reection and teaching cannot be explored in this paper. Andrew Nash 
has written a comprehensive book dealing with those issues (Nash 
2009: 65–130). Suce it to say that his teaching, while on the one hand 
unorthodox, innovative and inspiring, was, at the same time, experienced 
as upsetting, disconcerting and unsettling for a number of students doing 
the admissions degree before entering the Kweekskool. It is also quite likely 
that these students’ concern was encouraged and even exacerbated by a 
number of Dutch Reformed clergy, inside and outside of the curatory, as the 
stories about Degenaar’s classes and claims reached their ears. What these 
students found particularly unnerving, was the fact that Degenaar, in both 
the topics that he taught and in his personal disposition, seemingly moved 
within the paradigm of conventional Christianity in most of his courses, 
yet availed himself of interpretations of long-held beliefs that dramatically 
unsettled these conventional beliefs. e paradigmatic example of this 
tendency in Degenaar was his continuance, on the one hand, of Kirsten’s 
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practice of praying at the start of a lecture, yet, on the other hand, infusing 
those prayers with, for these students, perplexing contents, e.g. ‘Lord, until 
now, we have learned that our task is to make Christians out of people. 
Help us, henceforth, to make people out of Christians’. Another prayer ran 
as follows: ‘ank you for philosophy that helps us to look closely at life. 
Liberate us from our imagined certainties. Protect us from seeking new 
certainties, and make us content with the daily bread that you send us from 
heaven’.1
It is safe to say that Degenaar’s ideas were not necessarily experienced as 
undermining or disconcerting by all theological students at the time. In 
1954, Danie Malan, son of (at the time) prime minister DF Malan and a 
theological student at the Kweekskool, published a controversial article in 
Polumnia, the annual student publication of the eological Seminary. e 
title was: ‘Our idea of the soul and where it comes from’ (Malan 1954). 
2 is article precipitated much concern in conservative theological and 
ecclesiastical circles at the time. Malan basically argues that the idea of 
the human person as consisting of two entities, body and soul, of which 
the rst perishes aer death while the latter survives in eternity, either 
in heaven or hell, is not at all a biblical idea but wholly a creation of the 
Greek philosopher Plato (Malan, 1954: 36). is ‘unbiblical’ idea was then 
allegedly introduced to Christianity by St Augustine, the Bishop of Hippo, 
round about the year 413 A.D. Malan ascribes St. Augustine’s inability to 
see the shortcomings of his appropriation of Plato’s idea into Christian 
doctrine to St Augustine’s ignorance of Hebrew and his quite limited 
knowledge of Greek (Malan, 1954: 37). is false doctrine, argues Malan, 
was perpetuated in the work of John Calvin. Interestingly enough, Malan 
claims support for his (Malan’s) idea from the famous Dutch systematic 
theologian of the late 19th and early 20th century, Herman Bavinck, who, 
according to Malan, emphatically denied the doctrine of the immortality 
of the soul since this doctrine never occurs in the Bible. What the Bible 
1 e rst of these prayers is folklore in Stellenbosch; just about all Degenaar’s students 
know this prayer. e second prayer is my English translation of a transcription of 
one of Degenaar’s prayers by Zenobia Lutz. Lutz, one of Degenaar’s ex-students, also 
transcribed a number of his other prayers in classes of him that she attended. Prof. DJ 
(Daniel) Louw was so friendly to make a le of these transcriptions available to me.
2 My translation of Afrikaans: ‘Ons idee van die siel en waar dit vandaan kom’.
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does claim, according to Malan, is not the idea of the immortality of the 
soul, but the resurrection of the body – the body then as representation of 
the whole of the human person (Malan, 1954: 39). 
According to a personal communication that I received from Prof. 
Vincent Brümmer who, at that time, was a student in the Kweekskool, 
the ideas of this article were immediately associated with and ascribed to 
Degenaar’s inuence on the young Malan, even though the article contains 
no reference to Degenaar whatsoever. Malan was in 1954 registered for 
an MA in philosophy which he did simultaneously with his theological 
course, as was customary at the time. As will become clear in the following 
paragraphs, the ideas of Malan do have a notable resemblance to ideas 
propagated by Degenaar in the course of the 1950’s and assembled into 
the book Die sterikheid van die siel (e mortality of the soul) early in 
the 1960’s. e commotion around Malan’s article was a clear precursor of 
the more sustained controversy that Degenaar’s ideas – innocuous as they 
might seem to a current-day reader – provoked at the time.
4. e controversy escalates
Slowly but surely, resistance against the unnerving or challenging teaching 
methods and the ideas of this unusual man (Degenaar) began to grow. 
It is likely that this resistance might also have been fuelled by already 
established clergy who did not like what they heard about Degenaar’s 
work. Carel Anthonissen, one of the rst year theological students in 
1966 who still attended Degenaar’s rst year logic class, claims that the 
image of Degenaar as an almost ‘devilish’ underminer or subverter of 
faith was explicitly cultivated and reinforced by a few more senior students 
(Anthonissen, Undated: 1).3 
3 In the unpublished article of Anthonissen he relates the fact that Degenaar was once, 
at a function, introduced by a very prominent senior student, Boy Geldenhuys (chair 
of the SRC and of the Afrikaanse Studentebond, as well as head student of Dagbreek 
residence), who saw t to, in his speech, trace the etymological origins of Degenaar’s 
surname in Dutch. e term ‘degen’, originally meant a ‘dagger’ (‘dolk’ in Afrikaans 
or Dutch). e suggestion was not even subtle: ‘Degenaar’ represents the idea of a 
sinister ‘dagger’, which is, on the one hand, always hidden from public sight, yet, on 
the other, razor sharp, dangerous – even deadly. Anthonissen writes: ‘…so dramatic 
and upsetting were the prejudices that in that time were held against Degenaar’ 
(Anthonissen, Undated: 2, my translation)
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At the same time, a core of (usually the best performing) students were 
immensely impressed by how he taught them. ey experienced Degenaar 
as a/the most powerful formative inuence in their university education.4 
An example of this is Jacques Kriel, an ex-student of Degenaar. In a personal 
communication, Kriel writes: ‘I do not believe that Johan ‘aected’ the 
faith of any one of us. What we did attain, was a dierent perspective on 
and sensitivity for the [central message of] the gospel. We experienced him 
as a Christian, but we became strongly aware of his scepticism about and 
rejection of the standard theological models as well as the power structures 
operative in the church – although the latter was also executed with some 
sense of humour and never disrespectful. is we took over from him 
and tried to apply it’ (Kriel 2016: 1). Anthonissen also mentions the fact 
that Degenaar, in those early years, was oen noted as attending church 
services. His practice of praying in class and saying grace at home dinners 
continued for many years and is widely attested to.
e controversy surrounding Degenaar was, in particular, exacerbated 
by a number of critical papers that he delivered on the issue of faith in 
the idea of the ‘immortality of the soul’ – a collection that was eventually 
published as a book in 1963 by Simondium Publishers in Johannesburg, 
with the provocative title of Die sterikheid van die siel (e mortality of the 
soul) (Degenaar 1963). In this book, Degenaar not only openly challenges 
the conventional Christian belief in an immortal soul that survives death, 
but introduces, for the time, radically new ideas about the meaning of 
human bodiliness or corporeality, insisting that the notion of the body 
encompasses the totality of our human identity and brings to expression 
in a much more imaginative way the signicance of human existence. is 
doctrine obviously challenges and problematizes the (in church circles) 
conventional meanings of notions such as heaven, hell, punishment, 
purgatory, resurrection and eternal life. e body, for Degenaar, is the total 
or complete human being. He writes in this regard: ‘Against the generally 
accepted belief I propose the model of the body as situation. is, however, 
leaves no space for a greater emphasis on one part of what it means to 
be a human being. It does acknowledge the signicance of the idea of 
4 For some of these testimonies, see the two Festschris oered to Degenaar at, 
respectively, his 60th and 80th birthdays, viz. Du Toit (ed) 1986 and Hertzog, Britz & 
Henderson (eds) 2006.
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immortality, not because it literally suggests the fact of immortality, but 
because it [i.e. the claim to immortality] manifests something of man’s 
attitude towards his body and towards death…I therefore want to propose 
that, rather than an immortal soul, [the idea of] a broken body opens the 
way to deepened insight into the expression “the image of God”’ (Degenaar 
1963: 82–84).5
is was a new, for that time highly unorthodox, and for conventional 
prospective theological students, disconcerting voice in the Philosophy 
Department, let alone for those who considered themselves the custodians 
of these students. Degenaar’s performance was inevitably compared to that 
of Kirsten, and found to be profoundly dierent. Kirsten’s successor, Hennie 
Rossouw, in a published tribute to Kirsten on the latter’s retirement in 1973, 
wrote: ‘Prof. Kirsten used his philosophical insights to clarify things that 
are unclear and to open rich perspectives, but never to burden young and 
vulnerable souls with problems – souls who could, as a result, be brought 
into and le in confusion’ (Rossouw 1973).6 At the same time it must be 
stressed that there is no evidence at all of any tension between Kirsten and 
Degenaar at this or any other time. In all my research on this issue, as 
well as from personal information gleaned from the two individuals and 
their immediate colleagues, it is evident that their relationship remained 
mutually collegial, cordial and supportive.
5. A settlement aer the ‘kuratorium’ gets involved
Two realities had nevertheless to be faced and dealt with in one way or 
another. e rst was that the kuratorium of the DRC began to air 
complaints about Degenaar’s allegedly subversive inuence on some 
prospective theological students – subversive, it was claimed, to the point 
5 My free translation. e original Afrikaans reads: ‘Teenoor the gangbare opvatting 
stel ek die model van die liggaam as situasie. Dit laat egter geen ruimte vir ’n groter 
beklemtoning van een deel van die mens nie. Dit erken wel die betekenis van die 
onsterikheidsidee, nie omdat dit op ’n egte onsterikheid sou dui nie, maar omdat 
dit iets manifesteer van die mens se houding tot sy liggaam en tot die dood … Ek wil 
dus voorstel dat, eerder as ‘ n onsterike siel, ’n gebroke liggaam die weg open tot ’n 
verdiepte insig in die uitdrukking ‘die beeld van God’.
6 My free translation. e original Afrikaans reads: ‘Prof. Kirsten het sy wysgerige inigte 
gebruik om onhelderhede op te klaar en ryke perspektiewe te open, maar nooit om 
probleme af te laai op onrype geeste wat daardeur in verwarring gebring kon word nie.’
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of causing people to lose their Christian faith. From an informal record 
in the archive of an undated meeting between the then rector, Prof. HB 
om (written in his handwriting), with Prof. Kirsten, Dr. Degenaar, Dr. 
GP van der Berg, Dr. JD Vorster (actuary of the Synod and member of 
the kuratorium) and Ds. JS Gericke (chair of the kuratorium), it is clear 
that these issues were discussed. Kirsten apparently went to great lengths 
to explain dierences in philosophical approaches. Notably, these minutes 
state that, in terms of searching for a solution, ‘Dr Degenaar is willing 
to co-operate, and even willing to be constrained (‘om aan bande gelê te 
word’) regarding the areas in which he will henceforth be teaching’. e 
second reality that became apparent towards the end of the 1950’s and early 
1960’s was the fact that the Philosophy Department began to lose students. 
A document written by Kirsten that I will again refer to, shows the total 
numbers in the rst four years (i.e. the three undergraduate years as well as 
the Honours year) dropping from 81 in 1953 to 49 in 1958 (Kirsten 1962) 
– a phenomenon generally acknowledged as one of the most damaging 
eventualities for the survival of a university department.
e question is, was there any solution to this grave problem facing the 
department whose discipline was contained in the very name of the 
faculty which it was part of, at the time? e minutes of the meeting of the 
Faculty of Letters and Philosophy (‘Lettere en Wysbegeerte’) of 7 May 1958 
reveal the solution then conceived. Prof. Kirsten made a formal proposal 
that, starting in 1959, a new course in the alleged separate discipline of 
‘political philosophy’ (Afrikaans ‘staatslosoe’) would be created as a 
second stream (the so-called B option). e A and B courses would have a 
common rst year, but would dierentiate from the second year onward. 
e dierentiation would be maintained in the Honours course. While 
conventional contents (history of philosophy, as well as metaphysics, 
phenomenology and existentialism) would be maintained in the A option, 
which would be prescribed for prospective theological students and mainly 
oered by Kirsten (with a few remaining inputs by Degenaar), the B option, 
prescribed mainly for law students and others interested in politics, would 
entail a variety of themes from the tradition of political philosophy.7
7 From the ocial university documents referred to above, it seems clear that the split 
of philosophy into two ‘streams’ started in 1959. André du Toit, Degenaar’s later direct 
colleague in the Political Philosophy Department, nevertheless claims that he was a 
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Quite signicantly, the minutes of this same Faculty Board Meeting (7 May 
1958) contain an approved proposal that Senate be advised to investigate 
the possibility of creating a Department of Political Science ‘into which the 
courses in political philosophy could be incorporated’. 
It is clear that the creation of two ‘streams’ in the Philosophy Department 
represented a ‘solution’ that met with the approval of the kuratorium of 
the DRC. e archive contains a formal letter by Prof. om (dated 8 
July 1958) addressed to Dr. JD (Koot) Vorster, actuary of the DRC Synod, 
in which this new arrangement is duly explained, the decisive role of 
Kirsten in conceptualising the new dispensation is acknowledged, and it 
is declared that both the Faculty Board and Senate have agreed to the new 
arrangement (om 1958a). is letter is answered by one from Dr Vorster 
(dated 10 July 1958) in which he articulates the satisfaction of the DRC 
in South Africa (the name of the Western Cape Synod of the DRC at the 
time) (Vorster 1958). In all my research, I could not nd a single document 
containing the response of Degenaar himself to this train of events, except 
for the mentioned minutes of the initial meeting in which he, according to 
om, pledged his intended co-operation with the ruling. 
It is notable that, in the interviews I had with Rossouw and Du Toit about 
their recollections of these events (both were out of the country at pivotal 
stages of developments), neither of them has a memory of any in-depth 
discussion of the matter with Degenaar himself. Degenaar was in many 
respects a remarkable man – the epitome of friendliness and politeness, 
someone who always encouraged conversation and paid minute attention 
to listening to people, thus encouraging them to acquire, articulate and 
argue for their own views, rather than having views imposed on them. He 
made a lasting impression on most people that he encountered – most of all 
his students. Although it is reasonable to assume that the events narrated 
rst year student in 1957, and that he was under the seemingly clear impression that 
the split already occurred in 1958. is is one of the many instances in doing this 
research where I was initially completely baed by seemingly contradictory evidence 
as to that what actually happened! e probable explanation has to do with the fact 
that the two dierentiated streams had a common rst year, and that that rst year 
in 1958 as well as the 1957 rst year were recognised for both streams. Consequently, 
the new dierentiated courses were then actually only oered from 1959 onwards, in 
accordance with the decisions reected in the documents.
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above hurt him, he never admitted that much in any interaction that I am 
aware of.
From 1959 to 1962 the ‘two stream’ model was handled by Kirsten and 
Degenaar, as originally agreed. However, it became clear that their 
workload was too much; at that stage Kirsten was oering 19 and Degenaar 
17 undergraduate and Honours classes per week. In the course of 1962 
Kirsten consequently wrote a comprehensive motivation for the creation 
of a new post in the department (Kirsten 1962). What is also signicant 
is that, in this motivating document, there is absolutely no reference to 
the ecclesiastical complaints against Degenaar that prompted the 1958 
arrangement. e motivation for the two then existing streams in the 
department, is entirely developed along the lines of a renewed plea for 
the creation of a Department of Political Science for which the courses in 
the B option could be utilised. In his motivating document, Kirsten even 
mentions that the request for a political science department was originally 
voiced by the SRC in 1958! is creates the impression that Kirsten 
earmarked Degenaar to lead such a new department. It is also indicative 
of the fact that Kirsten at this stage deliberately downplayed the role of the 
earlier ecclesiastical complaints against Degenaar. 
In the meantime (and in the same document: Kirsten 1962), Kirsten made 
an impressive and comprehensive argument that an ex-student of the 
department, HW Rossouw, would probably be available for appointment at 
the beginning of 1963, should the university agree to the creation of such 
a new post. It should be added that Kirsten discussed the situation with 
Rossouw for the rst time on the former’s visit to Europe in July of 1962. 
In this discussion Rossouw expressed his willingness to consider a possible 
appointment, but only on condition that Degenaar would be satised 
with the arrangement. Aer Kirsten’s return to South Africa, Degenaar 
in a letter to Rossouw indicated his full support (Rossouw interview). 
Rossouw was awarded the doctorate in eology at the Free University of 
Amsterdam on 3 May 1963 and in the meantime had been appointed senior 
lecturer in the Philosophy Department. He started working on 8 May 1963, 
and taught in both the A and B streams of the Philosophy Department 
until the end of 1968 (Rossouw interview). e Department of Political 
Philosophy ocially came into existence from 1967, with Degenaar as head 
of department, and Rossouw then teaching in both departments. In the 
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beginning of 1969 Degenaar was promoted to professor, while AB du Toit 
was appointed in a new post in the Department of Political Philosophy. 
Rossouw’s involvement in the latter department then came to an end 
(Rossouw interview).
It is indeed a question as to what then happened to the idea of creating a 
Department of Political Science in which political philosophy (and possibly 
Degenaar in person) might play a prominent role. e record on this is 
not very clear. What is certain, is that such a department was created in 
1966, but with Ben Vosloo (solicited from Unisa), and not Degenaar, as its 
head. In the mid-sixties it started to become clear that Degenaar was not 
only very critical of traditional Christian doctrine, but also of the policies 
of the apartheid state. Having, in a sense, been forced to focus on politics 
in his academic work (something he hardly ever did in the 1950’s), he now 
gradually became a pronounced critic of apartheid – something that was 
not much appreciated in many circles of the Afrikaner-controlled state. 
Although I cannot (at this stage) prove it, it seems to me that Degenaar was 
consequently side-lined when the original suggestion of a Department of 
Political Science came to fruition.
6. Re-unication in the 1980’s
What is le to discuss in this article, is the process that eventually led to 
the unication of the two departments in 1987. e number of students 
taking both philosophy and political philosophy as subjects started to 
show a notable rise in the seventies and eighties. Political Philosophy 
always had considerably less students than Philosophy. e pattern of 
prospective theological students constituting the bulk of the intake of the 
Philosophy Department, remained the case until well into the 1980’s when 
the number of theological students dropped dramatically. At that stage, it 
had little eect on the Philosophy Department due to an overall shi in its 
clientele; non-theological students increasingly took philosophy as subject, 
and their numbers exploded in the course of the nineties – up to this very 
day, where an intake of 400 rst years, 250 second years, 100 third years 
and 18 Honours students, with about 30 Masters and 15 doctoral students 
(the current – 2017 - gures) have become the norm. e student numbers 
of the Political Philosophy Department remained relatively small. ese 
students were by and large quite intelligent law students.
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As the years progressed, a number of sta members were added to both 
departments. In 1969, André du Toit was appointed as senior lecturer in 
Political Philosophy. He was promoted to associate professor in the early 
1980’s, and, in 1986, le the department for an appointment as full professor 
in the Political Studies Department of UCT, from which he retired in 2003. 
Prof. Kirsten retired in 1973, aer Hennie Rossouw was promoted to full 
professor in the Philosophy Department in 1972. Rossouw was, from 
1 July 1974, joined by Prof WP (Willie) Esterhuyse, an ex-student of the 
department who, before his appointment at Stellenbosch, taught at the 
Universities of Durban-Westville and the (then) newly established Rand 
Afrikaans University (today the University of Johannesburg). Esterhuyse 
would, in the late eighties and early nineties, become a pivotal gure in 
facilitating start-up negotiations between the South African government 
and the ANC in exile. at, however, is a story outside the scope of this 
article.8 Rossouw and Esterhuyse alternated almost annually in chairing 
the department. An unlled junior lectureship was used in the course of 
the 1970’s to appoint temporary teaching assistance.
In 1980, Anton van Niekerk was appointed lecturer and Johan Hattingh 
junior lecturer in the Philosophy Department. e post of lecturer was 
newly created, mainly because of the rise in student numbers in the 1970’s. 
Hattingh began working on 1 July 1980, and Van Niekerk, who had to do 
national service in 1980, could only start on 1 April 1981. Rossouw was 
eventually appointed as the University’s rst Vice-Rector for Academic 
Aairs from 1 January 1985. Van Niekerk was, from the same date, 
promoted to senior lecturer, and Hattingh to lecturer. Van Niekerk was 
eventually promoted to full professor from 1 July 1989, and Hattingh to 
full professor from 1 January 2003. In 1987, Willie van der Merwe was 
appointed as lecturer. He was eventually promoted to full professor in 
1998, aer Esterhuyse’s retirement, and le the university and the country 
for an appointment in the Netherlands in the course of 2008. For its entire 
existence (1967 to 1987) the Political Philosophy Department never had 
8 For this story, see WP Esterhuyse: End-game: secret talks and the end of apartheid. Cape 
Town: Tafelberg, 2012. is book was simultaneously published in Afrikaans with the 
title Eindstryd: geheime gesprekke en die einde van apartheid. As an indication of how 
pivotal Esterhuyse’s role in bringing about these negotiations was generally regarded, 
a lm based on this book was made in 2014 with William Hunt playing the role of 
Esterhuyse.
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more than two full-time sta, viz. Degenaar and Du Toit. For a number 
of years Andrew Nash assisted them with temporary lecturing, before he 
attained a full-time position at the University of the Western Cape, and 
later at the University of Cape Town.
e possibility of re-uniting the two departments was increasingly raised 
and discussed informally during the early 1980’s. André du Toit, much more 
than Degenaar, played a prominent role in these exploratory conversations. 
As new sta joined the Philosophy Department (see previous paragraph) 
who had no rst-hand experience of the events that led to the division 
of the two departments, the justication for the continuance of the split 
increasingly faded away. In addition, with the retirement and eventual 
demise of the authoritarian ecclesiastical gures that led the assault 
on Degenaar, together with a general relaxation of views as well as the 
liberalisation of ecclesiastical doctrine in the Dutch Reformed circles, it 
became more and more inexplicable and less justiable to continue with the 
dispensation of two full-edged Philosophy Departments – a phenomenon 
almost without precedent, not only in South Africa, but anywhere else in 
the world.
A further reason for the growing sentiment in favour of re-unication was 
the disposition of Degenaar himself. As already stated, he himself hardly 
pressed for re-unication. To do so, would create the impression that he 
felt seriously aggrieved by the events of 1958–1967, and anyone who knew 
Degenaar, understood that he would at all costs refrain from such self-
belittling behaviour (as he would regard it). At the same time, he had, on the 
face of it, increasingly lost interest in the intellectual issues that allegedly 
precipitated the split in the rst instance – issues like the mortality of the 
soul, the non-metaphysical nature of God, Kierkegaard’s existential idea of 
religious faith, and the like.
Because he was now chairing a department of Political Philosophy, he felt 
himself morally compelled to pay much more attention to issues in political 
philosophy. at precipitated a whole new chapter of controversy related to 
his ideas, teaching and public contributions. Degenaar now became one of 
the most astute and vociferous critics of South Arica’s system of apartheid. 
Space will not allow me to explore the details of that role in this article; the 
interested reader is invited to peruse the discussions of his contributions 
in this regard in the dierent volumes of tribute to Degenaar that have 
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been published.9 Suce it to say that Degenaar never joined any opposition 
party or openly sympathised with liberation movements such as the ANC 
in exile. Although he oen participated in public debate via the newspapers 
and other popular media, his main work was conceived and communicated 
in an academic context. He particularly relished the strategy of analysing 
the work of prominent Afrikaner intellectuals such as NP van Wyk Louw 
(according to many the most important Afrikaner poet and intellectual), 
Gerrit Viljoen (rst rector of RAU and later a highly inuential cabinet 
Minister in the 1980’s) and Andries Treurnicht (leader of the right-wing 
opposition Conservative Party), identifying the inconsistencies in their 
work and pointing out the moral aberrations that followed from the 
application of their ideas.
Although Degenaar was loathed for these views by conservatives in the 
Afrikaner establishment of that time, this aspect of his work was welcomed 
and appreciated in the Philosophy Department, and increasingly at the 
University. ere were dierences in emphasis between Degenaar’s and 
Du Toit’s views, on the one hand, and views of people like Esterhuyse, 
Sampie Terreblanche (an economics professor at Stellenbosch) and others. 
Occasionally these dierences gave rise to polemical public debates 
between Esterhuyse, Terreblanche and friends, nicknamed ‘verligtes’, on 
the one hand, and Degenaar, Du Toit and friends, nicknamed ‘oorbeligtes’. 
In 1982, specically, a spirited debate occurred in the letters column of the 
Afrikaans newspaper Die Burger about the central issue dividing ‘verligtes’ 
and ‘oorbeligtes’ – the question as to whether the best way for intellectuals 
to counter and end apartheid was to remain part of the establishment and 
promote change on the basis of ‘loyal criticism’ (the ‘verligte’ strategy) or to 
break openly with the apartheid system and express critique on the basis of 
ocially and publicly declared opposition (the ‘oorbeligte’ strategy).
ese debates, although interesting (even gripping) for young academics 
(like the author of this article at the time!) and parts of the public at large, 
were, in the end, not indicative of fundamental dierences of purpose, but 
mainly about issues of the best means to attain the same end: the demise 
of apartheid. ey certainly were not sucient grounds for maintaining 
the existence of two full-edged philosophy departments in the same 
9 Cf. DuToit 1986 and Hertzog, Britz & Hendserson (eds.) 2006.
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university. About the nature of the subject taught by both there was broad 
consensus. 
ere was an additional factor that considerably facilitated the unication 
of the two departments. is had to do with the shi in the clientele of the 
Philosophy Department in the course of the 1980’s. Willie Esterhuyse, who 
mostly chaired the Philosophy Department during the 1980’s (Van Niekerk 
acted as chair in 1985 and 1986 when Esterhuyse was on an extended 
sabbatical) increasingly came to the conviction that the positioning of the 
Philosophy Department as ‘preparatory subject’ for people on their way to 
theological studies, as mostly conceived by Brümmer and Kirsten, was no 
longer paramount. Although Philosophy was represented on the Faculty 
Board of eology since the 1970’s, it did not entail more formal links or 
a more secure and extended role of philosophy training in the theology 
curriculum. Philosophy was never strongly encouraged beyond the rst 
year as a eld that potential theologians should acquaint themselves with. 
Consequently Esterhuyse, who himself was more interested in socio-
political philosophy and ethics, came to the conclusion that it would be 
better to position the Philosophy Department strategically as a centre 
of excellence in ethics; hence his own (at that stage in South Africa) 
ground-breaking work in the eld of business ethics. is approach was 
enthusiastically embraced by Van Niekerk who did maintain an interest 
in the philosophy of religion - the eld in which he gained his doctorate - 
but whose interest at that time was shiing toward biomedical ethics. Van 
Niekerk took over as chair from 1990 and, with the help of Esterhuyse, in that 
same year created the Centre for Applied Ethics (initially with two units, 
viz. for biomedical and business ethics). Esterhuyse was from 1990 until 
his retirement in 1998 seconded to the University of Stellenbosch Business 
School where he taught business ethics to MBA and other students. e 
creation of this centre, in turn, gave rise to the implementation of a new 
and quite successful MPhil Program in Applied Ethics since 1996. is 
entire shi in strategic positioning in the Philosophy Department greatly 
facilitated the unication of the two departments in 1989.
e realisation increasingly grew that, whatever purpose the separated 
departments might have served in the past, the times had changed and that 
the rationale (if any) for the continuance of two departments no longer 
existed. It also became apparent that there was unnecessary overlap in the 
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courses oered by both departments. Consequently, there was complete 
consensus amongst all members of sta, as well as in the ranks of the 
university management, that a unication of the two structures would be 
desirable. 
e Kweekskool, in the sense of both the eology Faculty and the Seminary 
for the training of Dutch Reformed clergy, was never ocially consulted 
about the matter, and no objection from those quarters was ever raised. 
e unication of the departments occurred without any ocial comment 
from the Kweekskool. Because philosophy continued to be formally 
regarded as an important subject for clergy and theologians in training, 
the Philosophy Department was ocially represented on the Faculty Board 
of the eological Faculty from the early 1970’s up to the rst decade of the 
21st century. During this time, both Rossouw and Van Niekerk (who were 
the representatives) played prominent roles as chairpersons of committees 
that investigated new programs for theological training in that faculty.
e unication of the two departments occurred between the years 1986 
and 1990. e initial steps to accomplish this were suggested by Du Toit 
in the early 1980’s and thoroughly investigated by him and Esterhuyse, 
then chair of the Philosophy Department. Both played a pivotal role in 
the process. From 1986 to 1989 a model was construed in terms of which 
the oering of courses in the two subjects would be rationalised. Students 
could continue to take philosophy and political philosophy as subjects, but 
in the second and third years of study the full credit count for the subject 
of Political Philosophy could only be made up with choices of modules 
from other departments, viz Philosophy and Political Science. e rst 
year module in logic was compulsory for all philosophy and political 
philosophy students, and was henceforth jointly oered by lecturers of 
both departments. Students were able to take both subjects simultaneously 
(although few ever chose to do so) and special arrangements were prescribed 
in order to prevent these students from having to follow the same modules 
for both subjects.10 It must be noted that Du Toit le for a new position at 
UCT from 1987. Van Niekerk acted as chair of the Philosophy Department 
during 1985 and 1986. Degenaar retired at the end of 1991.
10 See Yearbook(s) of Stellenbosch University, 1986: 75–177 & 117–119; 1987: 71–72 & 114–
117; 1988: 70–72 & 114–117. At the time, the Yearbook was only available in Afrikaans.
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In 1989 Political Philosophy as a separate department with separately 
identied courses (albeit rationalised as just explained) ocially ceased 
to exist. e 1989 Yearbook indicates only one department oering two 
courses or ‘streams’, viz. philosophy and political philosophy. e subject 
of political philosophy thus continued as a second stream (Afrikaans: 
‘baan’) in the Philosophy Department. e rst chair of the united 
department was Willie Esterhuyse. From 1990 to 2000, and again from 
2006 to 2013, Van Niekerk, who became full professor in July 1989, chaired 
the department. Degenaar, who retired at the end of 1991, was not at all 
interested in managing the united department. e courses oered at each 
year level were all tabled in the Yearbook, and it was specied which courses 
students had to take in order to attain recognition that they followed either 
philosophy or political philosophy.11 is division continued until well into 
the 1990’s. e question might be raised as to why the division of the two 
subjects was continued in view of the fact that the rationalisation of work 
was a strong motive for re-unication. e answer to this is that political 
philosophy, although always considerably smaller in numbers than 
philosophy, continued to draw mainly law students who also generally 
turned out to be rather good students – without, of course, implying that 
the philosophy students were not also smart! e fact of the matter was that 
timetables were so construed that it was de facto quite dicult for these 
law students to take philosophy as a subject; hence the need to continue 
political philosophy. at changed in the rst decade of the 21st century, 
with the result that, in that decade, all remnants of the earlier division 
disappeared.
Although the process of nally re-uniting the two departments therefore 
turned out to be protracted and lasted for the better part of half a decade, 
it occurred without any noticeable tensions between colleagues or students 
and, in the end, was welcomed by the rest of the university community. e 
Dutch Reformed Church which played such a pivotal role in the split of the 
1960’s disappeared as a relevant participant in the process.
11 Yearbook of Stellenbosch University, 1989: 55–59. 
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7. Concluding remarks
Time and space do not allow me any elaborate comments on the events 
narrated above. I would however, like to settle for three brief remarks.
1. Although this article dealt with a memorable event in the history of the 
department(s), faculty and university, it must be stated up front that these 
events were most unfortunate. Today it is unthinkable that a church, or 
individuals promoting a certain type of theology, could interfere in the 
academic aairs of a university in this way. Few values are as important 
to university culture and practice as academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy. Both were seriously violated with these events. It remains an 
unanswered question why senior and normally quite outspoken academics 
outside of the Department Philosophy at the time did not voice more 
urgent concerns about these matters, unless the process was so handled 
that the full story behind events was not adequately brought into the open. 
at these events were possible at Stellenbosch at this time in history, again 
shows the extent to which the university was viewed, and abused, as a 
‘volksuniversiteit’, as the latter term was later on to be adopted by Prof. 
om in an infamous address in 1965 in which he explicitly argued that the 
core of academic freedom resides in obedience to the (apartheid) laws. He 
also strongly argued that Stellenbosch University ought to remain bound 
to the Afrikaner people (‘volksgebonde’) (om 1965). e events narrated 
in this article, cannot be interpreted outside of this context.
It is nevertheless interesting to note that, despite his criticisms of the 
volksuniversiteit, and views of people like Verwoerd, om and AP 
Treurnicht, Degenaar’s own view of the nature of a university – incidentally 
a favourite topic which he for many years prescribed to his rst year students 
– contains an ambivalence that sometimes creates the impression that he 
himself was not entirely unsympathetic to the idea of a Volksuniversiteit. 
André du Toit points to this ambivalence in his article about Socratic 
freedom and the volksuniversiteit in the Festschri for Degenaar edited by 
Hertzog, Britz and Henderson (Du Toit 2006). Du Toit discusses a 1977 
article of Degenaar (Degenaar 1977) in which he (Degenaar), on the one 
hand, analyses the notion of a volksuniversiteit in the very terms by which 
it is normally promoted by its adherents, and then in the process shows 
that the academic freedom of a volksuniversiteit, understood in the very 
470 Van Niekerk  •  STJ 2017, Vol 3, No 1, 451–473
terms propounded by its propagators, cannot be threatened by a true, 
critical, Socratic dialogue, as these proponents seem to fear. On the other 
hand, he, by implication, also takes a very critical stance of the notion 
of a volksuniversiteit because of its scepticism towards Socratic dialogue. 
Degenaar’s view of the volksuniversiteit thus turns out to be considerably 
more complex than is usually thought.
2. e events surrounding Degenaar’s teaching and the reaction it evoked, 
are indicative of the way in which a certain model of religious experience 
and faith that was quite prominent in DRC circles in the late 19th century, 
was systematically overtaken by another model in the course of the early 
20th century. Both HW Rossouw (see his 2000) and Vincent Brümmer 
(see his 2013) refer to these developments, albeit it with dierent names. 
Rossouw calls it the replacement of a tolerant or irenic orthodoxy with a 
fundamentalist, antithetical orthodoxy. Brümmer typies it as the tension 
between the emphasis on piety and the emphasis on obedience to doctrine 
(‘regsinnigheid’). Alternatively, Brümmer identies it as the tension 
between mystics and confessionalists. Rossouw and Brümmer both argue 
that Du Plessis (and I would add, Degenaar later on) were educated in a 
context of theological practice and faith experience in which Christian 
orthodoxy was not entirely relinquished, but where the primary emphasis 
fell on the individual experience of faith, and where the eects of Christian 
commitment on the lives of individual people were regarded as of much 
more importance than strict adherence to the doctrines espoused in the 
confessions of the church. In addition, it was also an approach in which 
the change that faith could bring to the world was much more observed 
and practised in the lives of individuals than in the transformation of the 
structures and institutions of society. Brümmer quotes GK Chesterton’s 
analogy of the dierence between these two models with reference to the 
mystic St Francis of Assisi: ‘To this great mystic his religion was not a 
thing like a theory, but a thing like a love aair’! (Brümmer 2013:15). is 
mystic tradition, although now couched in an existential interpretation 
along the lines of Kierkegaard, does explain aspects of Degenaar’s work 
in philosophy and theology in the 1950’s and early 1960’s. He was, in the 
process, a victim of the removal of the hold or inuence that this tradition 
had on the DRC in the late 19th century, e.g. in the work of Andrew Murray 
and Nicolaas Hofmeyr. e actions against Degenaar were driven by the 
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adherents of the other grouping or tradition, i.e. the strict confessional 
tradition strongly inuenced by Abraham Kuyper (i.e. people like Koot 
Vorster and FJM Potgieter) who, at the time, also gained supremacy in 
terms of leadership roles in the DRC. e most inuential church leader 
in the Degenaar aair, however, was JS Gericke who, at the time, was also 
the Vice-Chancellor and Chairman of the Stellenbosch University Board 
as well as chairperson of the kuratorium. (e positions of vice-chancellor 
and rector of the university were, at that time, separated.) Gericke was by 
no means a Kuyperean; the mystic tradition seems to have also inuenced 
him. However, he was hardly a theologian of any note; only a wielder of 
considerable ecclesiastical and political power. 
What we have seen since the 1980’s up to today, is a combination of the 
gradual return to the values of the mystical tradition, with increasing 
secularisation and a concomitant loss of interest in the issues surrounding 
Degenaar in the 1950’s – developments that have greatly facilitated the 
healing of the breach in the Philosophy Department since 1987.
3. Finally, I would like to note the value of the maintenance of excellent 
personal relations and loyal collegiality in the face of crisis, as we saw in the 
reactions of Degenaar, Kirsten, Rossouw, Du Toit and Esterhuyse (as well as 
all other colleagues that followed) to the events narrated above. Kirsten and 
Degenaar, in particular, were in serious danger of mutual alienation and 
a fractured personal relationship because of these events. Yet, they never 
allowed that to occur, and continued a cordial and mutually respectful 
relationship right up to Kirsten’s death in 1992. Had this not been the case, 
the situation in the two departments could easily have deteriorated into 
jealousy, acrimony and destructive competition, to the serious detriment of 
the future of philosophy as discipline at Stellenbosch University. A healthy 
culture of not only respect but also continued philosophical and political 
debate between all colleagues was maintained throughout the thirty years 
of separation, thus illustrating the value of dialogue over intellectual 
immobility. For that example we can all be thankful.12
12 I wish to sincerely thank Hennie Rossouw, Willie Esterhuyse, Vincent Brümmer, 
Etienne Britz, Jacques Kriel and André du Toit for their valuable comments on the 
original manuscript. I also wish to thank the personnel of both the Stellenbosch 
University and the Dutch Reformed Church Archives at Stellenbosch for their valued 
assistance. I am responsible for all remaining faults.
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